In this paper we propose a preference-based conditional logic for credulous reasoning about defaults. A conditional default "if then by default " is either formalized by the strong preference " ^: is not preferred to or equivalent to ^ ", or by the weak preference "the preferred is an ". We show that these two expressions, instances of what we call the ordering and m inim izing usages of preference orderings, can be considered as duals of each other. Moreover, we give a formalization of ordering and minimizing in Boutilier's modal logic CT40 and we show how to combine them in a two-phase default logic.
I ntroduction
Conditional logic is a popular framework to formalize defeasible reasoning [Del88, AM91, Alc94, Bou94a, Mor95]. The conditional sentence "if (the antecedent or condition) then by default (the consequent or conclusion)" is represented in this approach by the formula > , where '>' is the implication of conditional logic. The popularity of this framework is based on the lack of strengthening of the antecedent of the conditional implication, which is used to formalize the specificity principle. For example, from the 'birds fly' default b > f the 'penguins fly' default (p^b) > f cannot be derived. H owever, the lack of strengthening of the antecedent also has drawbacks, in particular the so-called irrelevance problem. For example, from the 'birds fly' default b > f the 'red birds fly' default (r^b) > f cannot be derived. In the framework, the set of defaults derivable in the conditional logic is called the 'conservative core' and conditional formulas are added to this core by Delgrande's irrelevance Http://www.euridis.fbk.eur.nl/Euridis/welcome.html.
principle [Del88] or mechanisms equivalent to system Z [Pea90] like rational closure [LM92] , the minimum specificity principle [BDP92] or Boutilier's 'only knowing' construction [Bou92] . H owever, these solutions suffer from a specific instance of the irrelevance problem called the inheritance problem.
For example, given that penguins are exceptional birds b > :p, from the 'birds have wings' default b > w the 'penguins have wings' default (b^p) > w cannot be derived by system Z .
In this paper, we propose a conditional logic for credulous reasoning about defaults, i.e. a logic in which the two defaults > > p and > > :p can consistently exist together, where > stands for any tautology. Because it is a credulous logic, we can accept strengthening of the antecedent to solve the irrelevance and inheritance problems. Obviously, we loose the possibility to formalize specificity by accepting unrestricted strengthening of the antecedent. H owever, the following example shows another problem with unrestricted strengthening of the antecedent. The apples and pears problem can be solved by a technique, which might look odd at first sight, but which turns out to work well, namely to forbid application of R SA after W C has been applied. This means that in derivations first R SA has to be applied, and only afterwards W C may be applied. We call this the two-phase approach in default logic. Such a sequencing in derivations is rather unnatural and cumbersome from a proof-theoretic point of view. Surprisingly, the two-phase approach can be obtained very intuitively from a semantic point of view.
In this paper we show that the two-phase approach can be obtained by combining two usages of a preference ordering in a preference-based semantics of a default logic. For the two usages we define two different types of default conditionals, which we call type-1 and type-2 defaults. The two types of defaults correspond to two different ways to evaluate formulas in a preference ordering. Type-1 defaults are formalized by strong preferences and evaluated by what we call Ordering, a process in which the whole ordering is used to evaluate a formula. Type-2 defaults are formalized by weak preferences
and evaluated by what we call Minimizing, in which the ordering is used to select the minimal elements that satisfy a formula. The minimizing approach is commonly taken in preferential semantics for non-monotonic logics, see for example [Sho88, KLM90, Mak93, Bou94a] . In this paper, we consider credulous reasoning about defaults. In such reasoning, there can be several equivalence classes of preferred models. H ence, the definition of a type-2 default only considers truth in an equivalence class of preferred models instead of truth in all preferred models. In the two-phase approach, the first phase corresponds to ordering, and the second phase corresponds to minimizing. In semantic terms the two-phase approach simply means that first a preference ordering has to be constructed by ordering worlds, and subsequently the constructed ordering can be used for minimization.
In this paper we formalize type-1 and type-2 defaults in Boutilier's modal preference logic CT40 [Bou92] . The logic CT40 and the minimizing approach are well-known, but the logic of ordering and the two-phase approach to defeasible reasoning introduced in this paper are new. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give the preference logic in which we formalize type-1 and type-2 defaults as strong and weak preferences. We show that these preferences are instances of the ordering and minimizing usages of preference orderings. In Section 3 we show how ordering and minimizing can be combined in a two-phase default logic and how this solves the problems of Example 1. Finally, in Section 4 we briefly consider the sceptical case and in Section 5 we mention some related research.
A logic for reasoningabout defaults
Preference-based default logics are default logics of which the semantics contains a preference ordering (usually on worlds of a Kripke style possible world model). This preference ordering reflects different degrees of 'normality': a world is preferred to another world if it is, in some sense, more normal than the other world. For example, a value can be associated with each world; in such cases, the ordering is connected (for all w 1 and w 2 we have w 1 w 2 or w 2 w 1 ). H owever, in general the preference ordering can be any partial pre-ordering. H ence, only reflexivity and transitivity are assumed. An expression "by default p" is expressed by a preference for p, which may mean that 1. "p is preferred to :p regardless of other things", or that 2. "p is preferred to :p other things being equal", or 3. some intermediate reading.
Many authors (for example [TP94, Bou94a] ) take the second (ceteris paribus) reading, because the first reading does not allow for two or more unconditional preference statements to exist consistently together, as observed by von Wright in [vW63] . For example, the preferences for p and q will quickly run into conflict when considering the worlds p^:q and :p^q.
Ordering
In this paper, a strong preference for p means that ":p is not preferred to or equivalent to p, regardless of other things". Obviously, in a connected partial pre-ordering, the expression ":p is not preferred to or equivalent to p" is equivalent to "p is preferred to :p". H ence, for connected orderings, which are quite popular in preferential semantics, our reading has the problem described by von Wright. H owever, we do not restrict ourselves to connected orderings, but we allow any partial pre-ordering. With such orderings, the preferences for p and q will not run into conflict when considering the worlds p^:q and :p^q: these worlds are only incomparable. Notice that the whole ordering is taken into account when a default is evaluated. That is why we call it the ordering approach to default logic. Similarly, a conditional default "if q then by default p" is represented by "no :p^q is preferred to or equivalent to some p^q, regardless of other things".
The preferences are formalized in Boutilier's logic CT40, for the details and completeness results of this logic see [Bou94b] . CT40 is a bimodal propositional logic of inaccessible worlds. Boutilier notes that many applications of preference logics (like the one we describe below) do not need the complexity of inaccessible worlds, but it makes the definitions easier and the semantics clearer. Notice that the normality ordering is global (in the sense that the normality ordering is not relative to a world) and nested operators therefore do not have an intuitive reading, although they have a formal meaning in CT40.
CT40 is axiomatized by the following set of axioms and inference rules.
The following example illustrates the definition of type-1 defaults as strong preferences. The validity of strengthening of the antecedent follows from the fact that a strong preference of p over :p implies a preference of p^q over :p^q.
The most remarkable property of the logic is the invalidity of weakening of the consequent. Intuitively, the lack of weakening of > > p to > > (p _ q) is the consequence of the fact that > > p expresses a preference of all p over :p, because from such a preference does not follow that p _ q is always preferred to :p^:q. This is illustrated by the following example. Figure 2 
Example 4 Reconsider the Kripke model in

M inimizing
Type-2 defaults are defined as weak preferences in the modal preference logic. In this paper, we consider credulous reasoning about defaults. In credulous reasoning, there can be several 'extensions' or equivalence classes of preferred models. H ence, the definition of a type-2 default only considers truth in an equivalence class of preferred models instead of truth in all preferred models. For the details of this definition, see [Bou94b] . The default q > 9 p is true in a model if p is true in an equivalence class of most preferred jqj worlds of the model. H ence, the default q > 9 p refers to the preferred worlds where q is true, and > > 9 p refers to the most preferred worlds. The following example illustrates the definition of type-2 defaults and compares it with type-1 defaults. Figure 2 . The model satisfies > > 9 p and > > 9 q, whereas > > q is not true in this model. Since > > 9 q is equivalent to $ 3 2q it is clear that q has to be true in some most preferred j>j worlds, and also that less preferred j>j worlds do not effect the truth of $ 3 2q. Hence, in the evaluation of > > 9 q only preferred elements are taken into account and not the whole ordering.
Example 6 Reconsider the Kripke model in
The main properties of the logic are given by the following proposition. It illustrates that ordering and minimizing are duals, as far as we consider the properties strengthening of the antecedent and weakening of the consequent.
Proposition 3 The logic CT40 validates the following theorem.
WC 9 > 9 1 ! > 9 ( 1 _ 2 )
The logic CT40 does not validate the following theorems.
SA 9
1 > 9 ! ( 1^ 2 ) > 9 AND 9 > 9 1^ > 9 2 ! > 9 ( 1^ 2 ) DD 9 > 9 ^ > 9 ! > 9 D 9 :( > 9 ^ > 9 : )
Proof The (non)theorems can easily be verified by proving (un)derivability in CT40.
The logic validates weakening of the consequent, because the most preferred world that satisfies p 1 also satisfies p 1 _ p 2 . H owever, the logic does not have strengthening of the antecedent of > > 9 p to q > 9 p, because the preferred j>j worlds may be different from the preferred jq j worlds. This property is illustrated by the following example. 3 Two-phase approach to default logic
Combining ordering and minimizing
The idea of combining ordering and minimizing is to combine formulas with > and > 9 operators, where ordering should be strictly stronger than minimizing. H owever, this combination is not satisfactory in the logic CT40, because we cannot derive > 9 from > . The following proposition gives the relation between the two operators.
Proposition 4 The logic CT40 validates the following theorem.
> ^$ 3 ( ^ ) ! > 9
Proof The theorem can easily be verified by proving derivability in CT40. It is equivalent to the following formula:
H ence, when $ 3 ( ^ ) is false, then ordering is not stronger than minimizing.
For example, it can easily be verified that the logic CT40 validates the theorem > ? but it does not validate > 9 ?. In the following definition, > c has an additional condition which works like a 'consistency check' to test whether ^ is possible.
Definition 4 Consistent type-1 defaults "if then by default ", written as > c
, are defined as follows.
This new type of ordering is strictly stronger than minimizing, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The logic CT40 validates the following theorem.
> c ! > 9
Proof Follows directly from Definition 4 and Proposition 4. We already saw restricted strengthening of the antecedent in Example 1 in the introduction. We elaborate on Example 1 in Section 3.2. To strengthen the theorems above, we consider only models in which all propositionally satisfiable formulas are true in some world. This can be 'axiomatized' with Boutilier's axiom scheme LP, see [Lev90, Bou94b] for a discussion. The axiom scheme LP states that every formula without any occurrences of modal operators, which is propositionally satisfiable, is true in some world.
Definition 5 The logic CT40* is CT40 extended with the followingaxiom scheme:
LP : $ 3 for all satisfiable propositional We write j = for logical entailment in CT40*.
The following example illustrates the logic CT40* and the idea of combining ordering and minimizing. 
The two phases in a default logic
The two phases in a default logic correspond to the two different kinds of defaults > c and > 9 . Semantically, the first phase corresponds to ordering (> c ) and the second phase to minimizing (> 9 ). From a proof theoretic point of view, the first phase corresponds to applying valid inferences of > c like R SA, R A N D etc, and the second phase corresponds to applying valid inferences of > 9 like W C. The basic technique of default logic as a two-phase logic is that a conclusion of the form > 9 can be derived either with or without > c . In the first case > 9 can be derived via > c with Proposition 5, which says that the latter formula implies the first one. If so, we say that > 9 is derived in the first phase. In the second case we say that > 9 is second phase derived. The important difference is that in the first phase we can apply R SA to > 9 , because of the simultaneous occurrence of > c . We apply R SA to > c to obtain, for example, ( ^ ) > c , and then due to Proposition 5 we also obtain ( ^ ) > 9 . If > c does not occur simultaneously with > 9 , then there is no way we can apply R SA to this formula. Being a minimizing formula it lacks R SA. H ence, once > 9 has been derived in the second phase, we loose R SA permanently for subsequent derivations of this formula. Analogously, we can say that > 9 is first phase or second phase entailed by a set of premises, depending on whether S does or does not entail > c .
The following example shows that the two-phase approach solves the apples and pears problem of Example 1 in the introduction. 
Further research
Preference semantics are used in several different areas. In fact, the notions 'ordering' and 'minimizing' were introduced in a deontic logic based on preferences [TvdT96] . Although there are various subtle differences between these areas, see [Mak93] for a survey, we think that (at least) the following two discussions within deontic logic are relevant for default logic. First of all, the discussion about the validity of the deontic D axiom (see e.g. [TvdT96] ) is relevant for sceptical reasoning about defaults. Secondly, defeasible deontic logic [vdTT95] and its multi-preference semantics [TvdT95] can be relevant to formalize specificity.
We can consider the two-phase approach with sceptical reasoning about defaults. The obvious candidate for the sceptical type-2 default is "a conditional is true in all most preferred j j worlds", which we write as > 8 .
The following definition of this default in CT40* is from [Bou94b] . A solution of the previous problem is to define a preference ordering on models, which prefers models which are maximally connected with respect to the partial pre-ordering , i.e. with the most binary relations of . The preferred models of this ordering are the only models which are used for minimization. The ordering on models (v) should not be confused with the ordering on worlds ( ). The ordering on models is a technical trick to ensure that the worlds within a model are maximally connected, whereas the ordering on worlds expresses the normality ordering. Given the preference ordering on models, we can define a notion of preferential entailment, see [Sho88, KLM90] . Unfortunately, the previous example also shows that ordering is not stronger than minimizing, a condition for the two-phase approach. For this reason, we define a new type-1 default > D for the sceptical case, which trivially satisfies a counterpart of Proposition 5. The latter example shows that the specificity principle is not formalized in the proposed two-phase defeault logic. An interesting approach to this problem is the multi preference framework proposed in [TvdT95] .
Related research
An example of a default logic with ordering and minimizing is the dynamic interpretation of defaults in Veltman's preference-based default logic [Vel91] .
For example, in his logic the formula >[normally p] j = presumably (p _ q) means that after ordering all worlds by preferring p to :p, p _ q is true in the preferred worlds. A distinction between the logic proposed in this paper and Veltman's logic is that in the latter, the order of the defaults influences the set of derivable formulas. Moreover, in Veltman's logic defaults are not conditionals and ordering and minimizing are not modeled in the same object language.
Two phases can be traced in several popular non-monotonic logics like Reiter's default logic, autoepistemic logic and circumscription, which we illustrate by Reiter's default logic [Rei80] . Consider default theories consisting of a set of normal default rules : , which express that is part of an extension (a deductively closed set of formulas) if is part of the extension and : is not, and a factual sentence (for simplicity we assume that the facts can be represented by a single formula). For example, the 'birds fly' default rule b:f f expresses that f is part of an extension if b is part of the extension and :f is not; hence, birds are assumed to fly unless there is knowledge of the contrary. Type-1 and type-2 defaults can be identified in Reiter's default logic as follows.
1. For type-1 defaults, assume a fixed factual sentence. The 'birds fly' default b:f f is stronger than the 'red birds fly'default b^r:f f in the sense that if a default theory contains the first default, then the second one can be added to the default theory without changing its set of extensions.
2. For type-2 defaults, assume a fixed set of normal Reiter defaults. If the factual sentence of a default theory is b and one of the extensions contains f, then this does not imply that the default theory with facts b^p has an extension that also contains f (e.g., with default rules >::p :p and b^:p:f f ).
In this paper we proposed a logic for credulous reasoning about both types of defaults. In the vocabulary of a logic for reasoning about type-1 defaults, the 'red birds fly' default is derivable from the 'birds fly' default. The example illustrates that ^ : can be derived from : , which means that normal Reiter defaults validate strengthening of the antecedent. Similarly, it can be shown that : _ _ cannot be derived from : , which means that normal Reiter defaults do not validate weakening of the consequent. In contrast, type-2 defaults do not validate strengthening of the antecedent (of b to b^p in the example above), but they do validate weakening of the consequent (because extensions are deductively closed). In this paper, we combined type-1 and type-2 defaults by the additional condition that type-1 defaults are strictly stronger than type-2 defaults. For Reiter's default logic, this additional condition means (in the credulous case) that for every default theory with default rule : and factual sentence , there is an extension that contains . H ence, the reasonable additional condition means that for every default rule : , ^ is consistent.
